Electoral Violence in Myanmar
Introduction
Emerging from the Cold War at the end of the 1980s, a variety of Asian countries were catapulted from communism and the number of electoral democratic countries was increasing rapidly but they were not achieving border democratic reform such as participating the elections without restraint, improving representation, utilizing the elections as a tool to change the country political management strategy.[1] Among these problems, a significant problem is the use of electoral violence to influence the outcome of the elections. Then, evidences show that electoral violence has negative impacts on the electoral participation and reduce the equality and freedom of elections. In fact, Election is the foundation of democratic governance. It is a formal decision-making process for selecting representatives who will perform the activities of the elector’s desire and will be held accountable for their performance in office. In most of countries, Elections are held periodically to solve the problem of succession and peaceful transfer of power. In theory, the employment of elections also allows select leaders ought to provide a nonviolent alternative in conflicted societies to the use of force to adjudicate between rival claims to rule, and it ought to be a mechanism that allows citizens greater say over how they are governed. Yet in practice, these expectations often fail to conform to reality. Elections, especially the country like Myanmar where democracy is still fragile and not yet fully consolidated, are accompanied with significant levels of electoral violence. In that case, the legitimacy of the government comes into the questions whether the people really accept the public officials as their true representative or it involves coercions. So, it defies the very conception of democracy as built on nonviolent principles and people’s rules.
Myanmar is going to hold its third general elections on 8 November this year under the 2008 constitution written by the military. The first general elections held in this framework was applauded as a helpful contribution to the cause of democracy in Myanmar but the election itself was deeply flawed. There were many irregularities that are considered as electoral violence such as imposing restriction on monitoring framework and the free flow of information by the regime, and rejected opposition candidates by the Union Election Commission, reviewed all campaign speeches, and significantly restricted campaigning. Yet, the regime had a more free and fair general election in 2015 as observers accepted that the process was as credible and the results reflected the will of the people although there were irregularities and total exclusions of particular minorities groups. However, this year’s general election poses new challenges for a free and fair election with increasing armed conflict in parts of the country and due to global pandemic Covid-19.
This paper’ main objective is to explore major patterns of electoral violence in Myanmar and find the supportive ways to prevent the electoral violence in coming 2020 Myanmar election.
Literature on Electoral Violence
In general, WHO define the definition of violent as “The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation ” Electoral violence is “any random or organized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse an electoral stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence the electoral process.[2]
However, the researchers in political science define electoral violence it in two strands that affect electoral process and election result such as a sub-type of political violence and electoral fraud that concentrates around elections. Electoral violence is mainly levied by political actors to purposefully influence the process and outcome of elections. Kristine, 2010, argued that electoral violence is seen as a subset of political violence in a larger political conflict where the regime is communally divided ethno-cultural divisions based on language, culture, territory, and religion. In this kind of society, the political parties politicized the underlying historical and communal conflicts to seek to capitalize their popularity that eventually led to communal violence. When community groups organized along communal identities (often ethnicity or religion) for electoral benefits, electoral violence can also unfold in the context of violent communal conflict too. Secondly, the fraudulent elections that include activities ballot rigging, vote buying, disruptions of the registration process, harassment of the opposition and voter coercion used by political elites to manipulate the outcome. This type of violence is different from the earlier one because it doesn’t induce fear of physical injury and actual loss of life that results psychological effects on individuals and society. The electoral fraud is relatively well recorded by observers and monitors, who primarily work around election time, as it mainly occurs during election days. Whereas the first type of violence can happen even prior and after the election process. The irregularities of Myanmar 2010 general election were well recorded by observers amid tight restrictions. It was more of electoral fraud that occurred during the electoral polls such as the flaws of electoral frame and Union Election Commission biased in favor of a military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), other suspicious acts and mobilization of the electorate during the campaign period and polling time.
However, the electoral violence in the form of political violence or communal violence is always overlooked because it is part of the general conflict dynamics. Scholars adhere to the notion that the phenomenon can be distinguished from other types of violence by its timing and motives. If any group or party’s expectation doesn’t meet the results, communal violence can be perpetrated to overthrow or, either to alter or influence the election outcome. The timing of these kinds of electoral violence form pre-election phase to post-election period which is marked by a number of events and shifts focus from day-to-day politics to elections. This kind of violence is heightened when a political system which lacks developed and moderate parties, and where the political parties advocate extremist views, may have a higher propensity for resorting to violence as a way of channeling political dissent and to influence political processes (K Hoglund, 2010).
As an example, National League for Democracy (NLD) was defeated in 2015 elections in Meiktila constituency in Mandalay Region after the communal violence between Buddhists and Muslims in 2013. The region was the heartland of ethnic Bamar and NLD’s stronghold where the party had landslide victory 1990 and in 2012 by-election. When anti-Muslim violence swept through the region in spring 2013, there had been increasing campaign of Buddhist nationalism that was endorsed by radical Ma Ba Tha monks. The hardliner monks also conspired theories that NLD is controlled by foreign Muslim organizations and is becoming the symbol of Islam. So, If NLD wins upcoming elections, Muslim will overtake the country within the near future and Buddhism will die out. This drama had affected voter’s behavior, weakening NLD popularity. Thus, NLD lost all four seats related to Meikhtilar to Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), a party allegedly affiliated with hardliners.
The weakness of electoral commission is identified in several studies as a cause of election violence. The existing evidence strongly suggests that strengthening electoral commission can reduce the chances of electoral violence. In the next section, the administration of Union Election Commission (UEC) will be analyzed as it is a constitutional body entrusted with the responsibility of administering the elections in Myanmar.
Union Election Commission (UEC)
After years of rule, the Tatmadaw government adopted a seven-step road map for Myanmar democracy transformation under 2008 Constitution. As part of the process, a new Union Election Commission was established which must have at least five members who are age fifty or older, with the responsibility to organize the general elections and the registration of political parties and oversee their activities. The election commission enjoys broad and largely unchecked powers in the implementation of both these competencies. For conducts of elections, the UEC designate the constituencies for next term, and adopts rules and regulations, appoints election sub-commissions at state/ region, district and township levels at least 60 days in advance prior to the expiry of the term of the Hluttaw. It takes the duties of preparing voter lists, certifying results, supervising election campaign expenses by political parties and deciding on election-related complaints and appeals too. The UEC has authority to postpone or cancel elections in constituencies, and transfer polling booths in secure places in which free and fair elections could not be held due to a natural disaster or a situation of regional security.
Yet, the key concerns of the Union Election Commission are the lack of independence and impartiality of the Union Election Commission (UEC), both at the national and local levels because the members of the UEC are appointed by the president from the majority party itself. It raises the concerns of electoral biases towards the incumbent parties. In June 2015, a former army general and member of parliament from the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) stepped down immediately to take the position of UEC chairman for the year general election, and expressed views demonstrating a lack of impartiality. Then, he used the same rhetoric that is to say- conducting elections in a disciplined democracy style, closely associated with past Burmese military governments and incumbent parties while promising that the 2015 elections would be free and fair. The steps taken by the UEC thus far reflect a consistent favoritism to the regime that appointed it.
Moreover, there are concerns of UEC’s restriction of election campaigns and transparency in solving electoral complaints too. For example, Under the rules announced by the UEC, a political party must apply to the election commission for permission to present a campaign broadcast and submit a script for the proposed broadcast for review. It allows political parties to publish materials only if they paid a deposit and pledged not to oppose the regime or insult or sow dissent in the military according to the 2008 Constitution. Another UEC directive required parties to seek advance permission from the local commission for any gathering and to provide details on the time and place and the names and identifying information on speakers. The election procedures also lack appropriate mechanisms for resolving complaints. Complaints will be brought before tribunals set up under the UEC, with a panel of three arbiters composed of election commissioners. But in violation of international norms, complainants can only appeal a tribunal’s final decision to the UEC, whose ruling is final and made without judicial oversight. There is no possibility to appeal a UEC decision. The UEC seems reluctant to solve allegations of the misuse of religion during the campaign. There were at least four such official complaints in 2015 but no response was given by the UEC. The UEC needs a strong and effective mechanism, and the complaints-resolution process in a transparent manner in order to reduce electoral violence.
Nonetheless, the voter lists prepared by UEC always contained substantial errors, since the election in 2010 that marked the beginning of democratic transition, largely attributable to inaccuracies in the underlying data sources. It also excludes certain community members of religious orders, those serving prison sentences, those who have not been cleared from bankruptcy, and those who have assumed a foreign descent instead of ensuring all the citizens the right to vote. So, it is like the UEC itself institutionalized electoral violence as it remains unsuccessful to prepare accurate and inclusive voter lists which are essential for holding a credible election because it ensures that citizens do not lose their right to vote and that the ballot reflects the popular will.
Elections Before 2010 in Myanmar
Free and Fair elections can be considered as a primary root of democracy and a basic human right.[3].Generally, free and fair elections should include a clear legal structure, an independent election commission, freedom of right to vote, elections held at regular intervals, freedom of candidature and campaigning, universal, free, equal, and secret suffrage, right to monitor the elections.[4]
To analyze the historical background and role of elections, there can be roughly divided into four categories: British Colonial Era (1922-1947), Post- Independence Period (1948-1962), Burma Socialist Program Party Era (1962-1988), The Era of Multi-Party Democracy (1989-Present). During the era of the British Colonial Era, Myanmar held six elections and some Burmese political parties boycotted the elections under the British rules. For the second category, Myanmar held three multi-party national elections from June 1951 to February 1952, 1956, and 1960. In 1962, the military seized power and a revolutionary council headed by Nay Win administrated the country. The period between 1960 and 1990, the military banned all political parties and tried to set up a one-party nation in 1974 under the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) driven by General Nay Win. But after 25 years of the “Burmese Way to Socialism”, Myanmar became one of the at least developing countries, and mismanagement of Nay Win’ government in handling the problems such as demonetization of the money without warning or compensations and Maung Phone Maw[5] case were the major roots of the 1988 uprising. To handle these political instabilities, the military abolished the 1974 constitution, ruled as State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and promised to hold a general election shortly. In the 1990 election, the NLD party led by Aung San Suu Kyi won 392 of 492 seats, but the military caretaker government annulled an overwhelming victory and took the power until the 2010 election. Ignoring the election’s results can be seen as another form of electoral violence..
Electoral Violence, Election Commission and 2010 Election
On 2010, November 7, the first elections were held under the military government, and USDA (The Union Solidarity and Development Association) was remodeled to USDP (The Union Solidarity and Development Party) to take part in the 2010 elections. On the other hand, the winner of the 1990 elections, the NLD party steered by Aung San Su Kyi decided to boycott the 2010 election because the 2008 constitution and unjust electoral law were enacted by Myanmar military junta and disregarded the democracy and human rights in Myanmar. In facts, 2010 elections were the alternative plan of military government to retain his power to dominate the country again.
On March 9, 2010, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) released the five new laws, the Union Election Commission Law, the Political Party Registration Law, the Pyithu Hluttaw(House of Representative) Electoral Laws , the Amyotha Hluttaw(House of Nationalities) Electoral Law, the Region, and State Assemblies Law to hold the parliamentary elections in November,2010 and, as a result of these laws, the electoral commission became the most responsible independent organization to supervise the election and political parties. Nevertheless, the SPCD announced the 17 members of the election commission and most of them were retired government officials and served under the administration of military junta. Thein Soe, the former general was also appointed to be a chairman of UEC, and the transparency, accountability, and supervision of election commission in the 2010 election was wholly lack of dependency and failed to meet any international standard for a free and fair elections process.
These failures of UEC resulted in many people scared to support the opposite parties of USDP and “the resulting atmosphere of fear and intimidation was one of their most important tools to manipulate the election and ensure that the outcome was in their favor”. [7] In fact, some specific decisions of UEC were major tools of SPDC to influence the election and to control the electoral campaign. For example, UEC refused five Kachin ethnic minority parties to participate in the 2010 election. [8]. Article 7(c) of the Political Parties Registration Law restricted the direct or indirect use of state-owned resources including money, land, house building, vehicle, and other state property for campaign activities.[9] However, reports indicate that USDP mis-used state-own funds and offered targeted government construction programs, provisions of cheat loans to villages and other incentives to voters and UEC allowed the USDP to violate the electoral laws .
Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Election stated that “Every individual and every political party has the right to the protection of the law and to a remedy for violation of political and electoral rights”[10]. In the Rakhine State of Myanmar, the National Democratic Party for Development (NDPD) was one of two ethnic Rohingya parties and its electoral campaigns and activities was obstructed because of the intimidation by the USDP members that Rohingya villages would be dismantled if the party continued to rally for votes.[11]This phenomenon can be seen as a psychological electoral violence and USDP members used their existing power to influence the period of pre-elections and violated the legal framework .
As a negative consequence of lacking control and bias of UEC, voters could not choose their desired candidates and were threatened and were not able to express their opinions. USDP also forced the teachers, government staff to vote for the candidates of USDP. Regime officials pressured civil servants to vote the USDP and gathered the information of these staffs including ballot numbers, identification cards numbers, addresses to ensure their compliance.
The election laws state that “the respective Township Sub-commission shall arrange for the defense services personnel, students, trainees, detainees, in-patients at the hospitals and persons on duty who are away from the respective constituency to enable them to vote with advance ballot paper for their respective constituency.” Consequently, USDP used advance voting as a tool for ballot rigging and manipulating the voting results. In some areas, EC and SPDC staffs went from door-to-door to collect the advance votes and they forced the voters to vote USDP party.[12]
The role of media, national, and international observers play a crucial role in the electoral process. The right to access sufficient information, the right to observe the elections are the basic rights of voters and it can support to promote a free and fair election process. In the 2010 election,
The military government declined to enter the foreign journalists and election observers to the state and UEC also barred the international observers and journalists from monitoring the elections. The ministry of information announced a statement that all individuals associated the media were not allowed to enter within the 50 meters of polling stations.[13]These irregularities can be seen as a sub-type of electoral fraud that manipulate the outcome of the elections .
2015 Myanmar Election, UEC and Electoral Violence
On November 8, Myanmar held the general election under the 2008 constitution and these elections were a major achievement of Myanmar political transition from a military-dominated government. In these elections, NLD that boycotted the election in 2010 trounced the military-backed USDP with almost 80 percent of the elected seats. Although the 2015 election produced a landslide victory for the NLD party, 25 percent of seats in the parliament are reserved for military representatives nominated by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces based on the 2008 constitution. The military junta intentionally manipulated his power to influence the outcome of elections and control the government under the 2008 constitution. Generally, the 2015 elections were widely regarded as more peaceful and credible than previous elections but some irregularity and problems were still raised including the right of minorities in the voting matter, taking the 25 percent of unelected seats by the military, and using Buddhist nationalist narratives for party-political ends and so on. The problems were the major root of lacking independence and impartiality of UEC. Also, the members of UEC should not be affiliated to any political parties, but U Tin Aye, a former parliament member of USDP became the chairman of UEC and it is difficult to express UEC as an independent organization that governed the elections in 2015.
Myanmar has been plagued long-lasting conflicts between ethnic’s groups and the Burmese army. As a result, it is difficult to hold the elections in some areas with insecure and conflicted-affected areas and ethics armed groups occasionally used threats or violence to influence the pre-period of elections and the outcome of elections as well. In 2015, the NLD party could not run his campaign in Pao self-administrated zone because of the threats of the Pao National Organization.[14]
Union Solidarity and Development Party used such kind of strategy that harmed voting behavoiursbehaviors of people in the elections. USDP stimulated people to see the positions of itself as the defenders of Buddhism and Burma nationalism, and also affiliated with the Patriotic Association of Myanmar, abbreviated Ma Ba Tha in Burmese to accuse NDL as a supporter of non-Buddhism[15]. Furthermore, the four “protection of race and religion’ laws were enacted by Ma Ba Tha in May and August 2015 with the support of USDP, and Ma Ba Tha launched campaigns that encourage the anti-muslim by delivering their-own created fakes news and forced “Burmese voters not to vote Muslim party’ NLD”. This was a way of using religion as a mean of unfair political purpose and it significantly decreased the voting percentage of Buddhism voters who support NLD. For example, Meiktila is the central city of Myanmar and over 80 percent of people in there are Buddhism. In 2015, USDP party won all four seats because Meikhtila was a major city of 2013 Myanmar anti-muslim riots and religious related disinformation of USDP party had big impact on the voting choice of Buddhism people in there. According to the Article 58(C) of the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representative) Electoral Laws, the Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities) Electoral Law and the Region, and State Assemblies Law prohibited that “uttering, making speeches, making declarations and instigating to vote or not to vote on grounds of race and religion or by abetment of such acts”. Nevertheless, USDP tried to misuse of religion for electoral purpose and UEC also failed to take action on the violation.
Article (21), Section (A) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that “Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives and the article (25), Section (B) of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976) also states that “To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors” . So, the right to be elected in the elections are the major rights of every citizen and barring the candidate to take part in the elections can be considered as one of the major violations of electoral and human rights. In September 2015, UEC announced that 124 candidates were rejected to take part in the elections based on their citizenship status. [16] One third of the rejected candidates were Muslim candidates from Rakhine states including several candidates who had participated in previous elections without serious problems.[17] There is a need to protect every fundamental right of every citizen and UEC should also be a fair and independent organization that can protect the rights of residents.
2020 General Election and Challenges
The general election of Myanmar’s 2020 election would a challenge for the country’s effort to hold a free and fair. But the outcome is very much predictable. There will be significant election violence or ballot fraud. Overall, the election process will almost certainly fall far short of democratic standards. The Union Election Commission (UEC) has restricted independent elections monitoring and observation process, though they were allowed in 2015 election. This act already raises concerns for the transparency and credibility of election because it fits in the conceptualization of electoral violence. The 2020 electoral process is poised to be similar religious nationalism as previous election. In addition to all these challenges, the country is among the first in Southeast Asia to organize elections under the conditions of the Covid-19 pandemic that put the country into new risks and challenges.
Civil society organizations, such as played an essential role in monitoring electoral violence during the last two general elections in Myanmar, particularly in 2015 general elections. But the UEC imposed restriction on observing polls set for November, raising questions about the transparency and credibility of the election. The People’s Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE), a major independent group of election monitors in the country, had denied to observe 2020 general election on the basis that it had received foreign funding by the UEC. After considered criticism and pressure from international and local communities, the organization is finally allowed to monitor and observe 2020 general election. Yet, there will a wide range of electoral fraud such as vote rigging and buying as the independent observation and monitoring still is limited due to Covid-19 health measurements leading many international observers shut out of the country.
Moreover, the outbreak of Covid-19 compounds already existing weaknesses and disproportionate the electoral process. Political parties are barred to rally and campaign in open places and buildings and conduct door-to-door campaigning where a stay-at-home order is imposed. But the rules make disproportionate impact on political parties and voters. NLD, the incumbent party, has been the most beneficial in this health crisis. The party popularity boosted as it enjoys nearly exclusive visibility as a respondent. In addition, the UEC also seem in favor of the National League for Democracy (NLD). The party is driven by its chairwoman Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, that has started its campaign on a wide scale. In some places, due to strong public support, attendees at NLD’s rallies exceeded the limits. Furthermore, the USDP and 23 otherotherss parties have asked the UEC to postpone polls citing the impact of health measures on campaign activities. But the UEC has sided with the decision of incumbent party to hold polls as planned. It also censors opposition parties campaign speeches that is critical of the government in power and its policies preventing to present their policies in full.
So, both the UEC and NLD party has become the main target of violence confrontation. The Union UEC received bomb threat and NLD supporters were attack after the commission rejected calls from opposition parties to postpone polling day. Police and bomb disposal experts removed two grenades that appear to have been lobbed from the street to intimidate election officials into the Dekkina Thiri township compound of the city’s sub-commission chair, Thein Htwe. At the same time, there were clashes between Campaigners from the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and National League for Democracy (NLD) supporters. At least six USDP campaigners were arrested for pelting rocks NLD’s supporter’s home with rocks in Meiktila under charges of committing obscene acts and intentionally causing hurt. The USDP supporters also file the case in return counterclaiming that it was NLD supporter that disrupted and injured the campaigners when they came to the village. However, the UEC said that it will get involved only if it is get worsen, now it’s up to the police. Tthe UK-based Burma Human Rights Network already warned that the opportunity for violence in these areas is high in a statement. Days after, the family of the NLD’s township-level executive committee leader, Kanni village, Myaing township of Magwe region, escaped death after about 100 people their house after they started playing NLD victory song. The mob destroyed their house, car and motorcycles among other properties. The mob also threw stones at two vehicles from police force and General Administration Department used to protect the family. The police charged thirty-two attackers under the protection of public property act.
The Ethnic and religious nationalism also can grip with the effects of ‘hate speech’, misinformation, and disinformation particularly against Muslim community in the context of elections. the USDP has repeatedly attacked the nationalist credentials of Aung San Suu Kyi’s ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) in an effort to appeal to voters. The USDP has used such tactics successfully in the past. In 2013, violence between Buddhists and Muslims near Mandalay helped the USDP reclaim a seat from the NLD in 2015 elections. The USDP appears intent to play the nationalism card again in order to steal support from the NLD. Even before NLD released its candidates list for the election, there has been a number of fake news circulating that the will field more than 50 percent of the Muslim candidates. However, two Muslims have been added to the list of NLD candidates in the upcoming 2020 election. Then, those two most Muslim candidates have become the main target of the fake news which is mainly spread by Tatmadaw and USDP supporters. There is also widespread anti-Rohingya sentiment running by political parties seeking to politicized about 720000 refugees return from Bangladesh on the underlying historical and communal conflicts that led to the violence in the first place. According to a report released by Loka Ahlin, it is USDP and the National Progressive Party (NDP), in terms of the political parties, that spread the most racial and religious profiling posts on social media. So, the constituencies, such as Pabedan in Yangon and Miektila in Mandaly, where Muslim cadidates will compete is more likely prone to physical violence or intimidation of individuals, with the others consisting of the destruction of election materials or infrastructure.
In order to prevent electoral violence, the state needs an effective and clarified mechanisms to solve electoral disputes to timely serve justice in the occurrence of electoral violence. The framework of electoral disputes needs to guarantee complainants an effective and timely remedy for violations of people’s rights. In addition, the election laws need to establish a clear process for the resolution of electoral disputes, which falls under the UEC’s authority. Indeed, the current legal framework on elections seems to be designed to discourage complaints. The framework also should clearly distinguish between criminal offenses and those that the UEC can address. Then, many matters that could have been addressed and remedied by the UEC won’t be instead reported to the police unlike the current situation.
Understanding Electoral Violence in Asia, United Nation Development Programme , Asia- Pacific Regional Center .
[2]USAID. “Best Practices in Electoral Security: A Guide for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Programming.” January 2013. Accessed at http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2496/Electoral_Security_Best_Practices_USAID.pdf
[3] The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Guidelines for Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections, 10 (2001).
[4] The Public International Law & Policy Group, the 2010 Burmese elections: Neither free nor fair.
[5] In March 1988, Maung Phone Maw, Student of Rangoon Institute of Technology (RIT), was gunned down by the police the day after a clash between the RITs’ students and people in Gyo Kone, Insein.
[6] Youth Agency and Peacebuilding: an analysis of the role of formal and non-formal education. Synthesis report on findings from Myanmar, Pakistan, South Africa and Uganda by: Mieke T.A. Lopes Cardozo, Sean Higgins, Marielle L.J. Le Mat available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317718190_Youth_Agency_and_Peacebuilding_an_analysis_of_the_role_of_formal_and_non-formal_education_Synthesis_report_on_findings_from_Myanmar_Pakistan_South_Africa_and_Uganda
[7] Burma election 2010: An election general, published by the Thai Action Committee for Democracy in Burma.
[8] Burma’s 2010 Election Campaign: Issue for Congress by Michael F.Martin ,Specialist in Asian Affairs ,October 6 2020.
[9] Political Parties Registration Law art. 7(c) (Burma, 2010), available at https://www.mlis.gov.mm/mLsView.do?lawordSn=1408.
[10] Inter-Parliamentary Union, Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections, art. 3.9-3.11(Mar. 26, 1994).
[11] Q&A on elections in Burma by Human Right Watch , https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/03/qa-elections-burma#_Have_parties_faced.
[12] Observation report ,2010 Myanmar General Elections, Learning and Sharing for Future, by Center for peace and conflict studies available at https://www.centrepeaceconflictstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2010-Myanmar-Observer-report.pdf
[13] Myanmar to Keep Close Watch on Media Before Poll, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2010), available at
http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-52570220101031.
[14] For background, see “NLD members threatened at gunpoint to resign in east Burma”, The Irrawaddy,23 May 2013. The Pao National Organization is both an armed group with a ceasefire as well as a political party (which the group also registered as).
[15] Ostwald, K., & Schuler, P. (2015). Myanmar’s Landmark Election: Unresolved Questions. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
[16] Myanmar Election: The ‘Real Burmese ‘Dilemma by Courtney Weatherby, The Diplomat, available at https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/myanmars-election-the-real-burmese-dilemma/
[17] Burma: Election Fundamentally Flawed, Key Elements of Electoral Process Structurally Unfair, Discriminatory, Human Right Watch, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/04/burma-election-fundamentally-flawed
